Unconditionally secure message authentication is an important part of Quantum Cryptography (QC). We analyze security effects of using a key obtained from QC in later rounds of QC. It has been determined earlier that partial knowledge of the key in itself does not incur a security problem. However, by accessing the quantum channel used in QC, the attacker can change the message to be authenticated. This, together with partial knowledge of the key does incur a security weakness of the authentication. We suggest a simple solution to this problem, and stress usage of this or an equivalent extra security measure in QC.
INTRODUCTION

Quantum Cryptography
1-4 is motivated by the problem of sharing a secret key between two users. Other ways of sharing secret keys exist, such as public key-sharing systems based on the difficulty of performing certain computational tasks, or usage of a courier based on trust of the courier. Here, we will study certain aspects of a Quantum key sharing system, or perhaps more accurately, a Quantum Key Growing (QKG) system. Such a system consists of two channels between the two users (Alice and Bob), a quantum channel on which a partially common, partially secret bitstream is created and a classical channel on which a classical protocol is implemented to establish a common secret key. In our analysis there will also be an attacker (Eve), an eavesdropper, whose intent is to gain knowledge on the key unnoticed by Alice and Bob.
Other contributions to this conference discusses the properties of the quantum channel at some length, so we will restrict ourselves here to note that the quantum channel can be eavesdropped upon, but there is a price: there will be noise introduced into the channel if Eve attempts to eavesdrop. In short, Eve can extract information from the quantum channel but the more information she extracts, the more noise she will introduce. Eve has in fact complete control of the quantum channel, but she wants to disturb it as little as possible to avoid detection.
The classical channel, on the other hand, does not show this behaviour, but is an open classical channel on which Eve can eavesdrop as much as she likes. It is important to realize that while Eve is allowed to listen, she should not be able to write to the channel. If she can change the data on the classical channel, she will be able to impersonate Bob to Alice, and establish a key with her, and impersonate Alice to Bob, and establish a key with him. All she has to do now is to intercept any encrypted message from Alice to Bob, decrypt it with her Alice-key and encrypt it with her Bob-key and send the result to Bob. This is the usual man-in-the-middle attack, made possible if Eve can change data transmitted on the classical channel.
It is not realistic to assume that the classical channel is immutable, so authentication needs to be used to verify the authenticity of data received through the classical channel. Of course, the authentication will use up some key, and hence the use of the word "growing." The system needs to be set up with a small amount of already shared secret key, at least as much as is needed for one authentication. The operation of a QKG system is thus to use the two channels and a small portion of some already shared key to generate a new key portion, larger than the one just used. This is repeated in rounds that consist of the following steps:
1. Raw key generation: Use the quantum channel to share quantum systems (e.g., "qubits") that transmit/generate a bit sequence, shared between Alice and Bob but equal only in a portion of the positions. The size of this portion depends on the protocol used, properties of the channel, and whether or not Eve is listening on the quantum channel.
2. Sifting: Remove most of the bits that do not match by comparing parameter settings of each use of the quantum channel. This will discard noisy bits without sending any information about the value of the bits on the classical channel. A smaller "sifted" key is obtained which is equal at Alice and Bob in a considerably larger portion, the size of which depends on properties of the channel and whether or not Eve is listening.
3. Error correction, or key reconciliation: 5 Perform error correction on the sifted key and estimate the error rate to detect whether or not Eve was listening on the quantum channel, either with a few sacrificed bits from the sifted key, or with some of the sifted-out bits from the last step, depending on details of the protocol. If the error rate is above a pre-determined bound, Alice and Bob conclude that Eve has been listening and the round must be aborted.
Privacy amplification:
6-8 If the noise is lower than the predetermined bound, Eve may still have been listening but in that case she has opted to only extract very little information. In this case, Alice and Bob can perform "privacy amplification" to lower Eve's information even further, sacrificing a few bits of the sifted key in the process.
Authentication:
9-11 Make sure that the messages on the classical channel in steps 2-4 were not modified by Eve (see below for details). The authentication uses already shared key bits, which must be discarded after use. If the authentication fails, Alice and Bob conclude that Eve has tried to interfere and the round must be aborted.
It is of course important that the key portion produced is longer than the one used in the last step, so that we actually have a Quantum key growing system. It has been shown that this can be achieved, even with an imperfect quantum channel. As long as the errors are within some limits QKG will still produce (grow) a key that is both shared and secret.
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Eve's presence is detected via high error rate on the quantum channel in step 3 or failure of authentication on the classical channel in step 5. Note that if Eve breaks one round, the key grown in that round will be known by Eve, and since part of this key is used for authentication in later rounds, Eve can break these rounds also, and so on.
A complication is the fact that the error correction is not perfect. An error can sneak through with small probability. If that error is in the key portion used for authentication in a later round, the authentication will fail even without Eve being present. An additional problem is that the privacy amplification cannot remove all Eve's knowledge on the key (unless we sacrifice all the sifted key). This latter problem is usually not seen as a big issue since Eve's remaining knowledge on the shared key is very small, and so is her chance of breaking the encryption. However, Alice and Bob will eventually use this grown secret key for authentication of messages in their key growing process. We will examine the authentication closely below, especially whether or not partial knowledge of the key used in authentication enables Eve to break it, even at very low knowledge the key.
WEGMAN-CARTER AUTHENTICATION
The authentication used in this context is known as Wegman-Carter authentication.
9-11 It uses a family of hash functions H that map messages into short tags. If Alice wants to send an authenticated message to Bob, she uses a small amount of key k that she already shares with Bob to select one hash function h k from the family H. She then uses that hash function to create a tag t A from her message m A ,
She then transmits the message and the tag to Bob. When he receives the message-tag pair, he proceeds to use his copy of the key portion k to create another tag from the message, and then compares it with the tag he received from Alice. If the two coincide, the message is deemed to be authentic.
If Eve wants to change the message in transit, she will have to create a new tag. But Eve does not know the key used, and thus, does not know what hash function to use from the family H. Wegman-Carter authentication is constructed so that guessing the hash function is hard, even if one has seen one message-tag pair as Eve has done in this case. In fact, Wegman-Carter authentication is the authentication equivalent of the Vernam cipher (or the one-time pad, see e.g., Ref. 18) . The Vernam cipher is cryptographically secure in the following sense:
If you try to decode a message encrypted with the Vernam cipher and the key is unknown to you, all plaintexts are equally probable.
Wegman-Carter authentication is secure in the following sense:
If you try to create a tag for a message and the key is unknown to you, all values of the tag are equally probable. b) The fraction of those functions that also map an arbitrary m 2 = m 1 in M to an arbitrary t 2 in T is no more than .
The minimum value of the parameter is 1/|T |, but then 9 the needed size of H would be on the order of the size of M. This would mean that the key used would need to be as long as the message which is quite useless. Therefore one uses a slightly larger value of , one common value 10 is 2/|T |. In this case, the size of the needed hash function family increases only logarithmically with the size of the message, and using the 2-logarithm, we have For example, a 100 kbit message and a 32 bit tag would give |H| ≈ 2 32·4·17 = 2 2176 , which means that the key needs to be approximately 2 kbit long.
Eve's probability of generating a correct tag for her message without any information about the key would be 1/|T | = 2 −32 , and having seen a message-tag pair it would increase to (at most) = 2/|T | = 2 −31 . Eve cannot attempt to break the authentication every round, because she will be caught almost with certainty. She can attempt sparsely, because the error correction is not perfect. As an example, if an extra error caused by Eve every tenth second (on average) is not noticeable, Eve will still have to try for, on average, 680 years before the encryption is broken. This would be long enough for most purposes.
PARTLY KNOWN KEY
But now we return to the statement of security above. It said ". . . and the key is unknown to you. . . " In fact, as we have seen, Eve has partial knowledge on the key. In other words, the key is still random but has a non-uniform distribution, for example as in Fig. 3 . This means that the tag also may have a nonuniform distribution.
It can also be the case that Eve has information that allows her to completely rule out certain key values. In this case, the distribution would look like the one in Fig. 4 . However, for this to really help Eve needs to be able to rule out many keys, and we know from above that she has only very little information on the key. For example, 1 bit of information will enable her to rule out half of the key values, and 1 /8 bit of information will We now move to the case where Eve also has seen a message-tag pair. Eve now has information from two sources. By combining these two sources, she may now know the correct tag for her message (see Fig. 5 ). If the message-tag pair that Eve receives singles out a group with fewer than |H|/|T | key values left, these key values may be kept in the same group by the grouping induced by Eve's message. Furthermore, Eve has some freedom in choosing her message, so to be on the safe side, we will assume that Eve can choose her message so that she is sure she can break the authentication as soon as there are fewer than |H|/|T | key values left after seeing one message-tag pair. There is no guessing involved, and Eve can replace the message-tag pair on the classical channel with her own message-tag pair without any risk of detection. Figure 5 . If Eve has ruled out some key values and one message-tag pair has been seen, it may happen that the group that is singled out only contains a few key values. The grouping induced by Eve's message may now keep these key values in the same group. Then, there is only one possible tag value corresponding to that message, so Eve may suddenly know the correct tag for her message.
This enables Eve to follow a perhaps unexpected strategy:
• Eavesdrop on the quantum channel, but do not extract too much information because of the risk of detection.
• Listen on the classical channel, and wait for the "right" message-tag pair to arrive, the one that allows Eve to determine the tag for her message.
• Then and only then replace the message-tag pair.
• This will break the authentication reliably.
Eve can now perform her attack silently each round and only do the replacement when she is certain of success. However, both the grouping induced by the message and the key must be beneficial to Eve for her to succeed. Let us assess the severity of this threat by estimating how often this will happen.
First, we will also assume that Eve can do nothing more than remove key values essentially at random with her initial knowledge of the key. The message-tag pair that Eve receives corresponds to drawing |H|/|T | key values from H without returning them. The true key will always be present in the drawn key values (and is of course one of the remaining, possible, key values), while the other |H|/|T | − 1 key values are drawn from |H| − 1 key values of which r|H| − 1 are "possible." The number of drawn possible key values, X, will be hypergeometrically distributed with the indicated parameters, and while this hypergeometric probability is complicated, the Chebyshev inequality and
will give
In practice, the right-hand constant is very small. In our example with a 2/|T |-ASU 2 hash family, a 100 kbit message and a 32 bit tag, this translates to
At one attempt per round and 1000 rounds/s, it would take 10 633 years on average to break the system. Apparently, this little information on the key does not affect the security of the authentication used. This is ensured by the Chebyshev inequality, and agrees with the result in Ref. 19 . In short, the grouping is such that (with high probability) each group will contain a number of key values close to r|H|/|T | |H|/|T |, which is not beneficial to Eve.
CHEATING THE CHEBYSHEV INEQUALITY
Recall that Eve wants the key to end up in a group with |H|/|T | remaining key values, but the Chebyshev inequality ensures that the groups contain r|H|/|T | remaining key values with high probability. But this is for a random message from Alice, that is, a message that is random to Eve. But the message from Alice is influenced by events on the quantum channel, and Eve is in control of the quantum channel. In essence, she can influence the message and hence the grouping.
The worst-case scenario (for Alice and Bob) is when she can arrange the grouping so that the groups either contain |H|/|T | remaining key values or |H|/|T | remaining key values, to have as many groups as possible that are beneficial to her, see Fig. 6 . This will change the probability distribution discussed above, so that the argument that used the Chebyshev inequality does not apply anymore. The probability of the key ending up in a group with less than |H|/|T | remaining key values is simply the number of such groups divided with the total number of groups, which simplifies to
Comparing this with the bound in (4), it is obvious that there is an immense difference between the two, because |T |/|H| . Previously, we estimated the time for Eve to break the authentication to 10 633 years. In our example, with a 2/|T |-ASU 2 family, a 32-bit key, and r = 91.7% (1/8 bit of knowledge of the key), we get
In this case, at one attempt to break the authentication per round, and 1000 rounds/s, it would take nine months (on average) to break the authentication.
PREVENTION
To prevent Eve from using the above attack, Alice and Bob may a) adjust the parameters |T | (larger tag) and/or r (more privacy amplification), or b) ensure that Eve must send her message to Bob before she has seen both the message and the tag from Alice.
The first alternative is simple but will decrease the rate of key production, and that may not be desirable. Minimizing this effect would require a detailed analysis of each individual QKG protocol.
The second alternative is simpler, more efficient and generic but does require a slight change to the protocol. One solution is using synchronized clocks and sending messages and tags at pre-agreed times, with a pause longer than the precisions of the clocks. Synchronized clocks are already recommended for other purposes in present QKG systems.
14 Another solution that does not need clocks is for Alice to send the message to Bob, who replies with a large random number never seen by Eve or used before, a salt. Alice calculates her tag based on the concatenation of the message and the salt and sends that tag to Bob. Eve must now decide whether to perform her attack or not (i.e., exchange Alice's message for her own) without knowing if her attack will be successful, since she has not seen Alice's tag, or indeed, the salt. Eve can either send the real message to Bob and fail but stay undetected or send Bob a faked message, and hope to be successful in forging the tag. But with the above parameter choices, it is almost certain that the tag she receives from Alice won't give the appropriate additional information, which reduces this attack to the simple guessing strategy initially described above.
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, even though it appears that a small amount of information on the key does not affect WegmanCarter authentication, the usual implementation of a QKG system contains an additional subtlety. Eve can change the message to be sent, and together with partial knowledge of the key, this opens up Eve's possibilities. Fortunately a simple remedy exists: force Eve to make her attack before she knows that it will succeed, by making sure Alice will not send the authentication tag until either Bob has received the message or Eve has attempted breaking the system. A physical QKG system might already have similar properties since a round normally consists of a dialogue of several messages and an authentication tag for all of them at the very end of the round. Whether that is enough to keep the system secure depends on the details of the system, but implementing the solution proposed here is cheap and requires no deep analysis of the system. We would therefore recommend doing just that in future QKG systems.
